Analysis · Corporate governance
SecurityScorecard’s Board Was Warned. Could Shareholders Sue Under Caremark?
How Delaware’s Caremark doctrine could expose longtime directors to liability if they ignored warnings of alleged executive misconduct.
The federal complaint says that on May 15, 2026, a cease-and-desist notice went to SecurityScorecard's board of directors, and that afterwards the company “seemingly took no action” while the conduct complained of “continued” and “increased” (Complaint ¶ 42). If that is true, it raises a governance question separate from the lawsuit itself: when a board is warned about an executive's conduct and does nothing, can the company's own stockholders hold the directors to account? Delaware's answer runs through a 1996 decision called Caremark. It is a real remedy, and one of the hardest claims in corporate law to win. No court has found any SecurityScorecard director liable for anything, and no such claim has been filed.
01What Caremark actually requires
In In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996), Chancellor Allen held that directors have a duty to make a good-faith attempt to ensure that adequate information and reporting systems exist, and called a claim for breaching it “possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.” A decade later, Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006), placed oversight inside the duty of loyalty and set the two-part test courts still use: directors are liable only if they utterly failed to implement any reporting system, or, having one, consciously failed to monitor it. Either way, the plaintiff must show bad faith: that directors knew they were not discharging their duties.
Figure 1 · The two Caremark prongs (Stone v. Ritter)
Prong 1 · Information systems
Directors “utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system or controls.”
Rarely pleaded successfully. Marchand: no board-level system for food safety, the company's mission-critical risk.
Prong 2 · Red flags
Having a system, directors “consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations,” disabling themselves from being informed of risks.
The usual path when a board is alleged to have received warnings. Requires known red flags and a conscious failure to act.
Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019), showed the doctrine has teeth. The Delaware Supreme Court revived claims against Blue Bell's directors because the board had no system for monitoring food safety, the company's central compliance risk, before a deadly listeria outbreak. In re Boeing (Del. Ch. 2021) followed for airplane safety. In re McDonald's, 289 A.3d 343 (Del. Ch. 2023), held that officers owe an oversight duty too, and that red flags about an executive's misconduct toward others can matter.
The second prong, red flags, is the relevant one here. A red flag must be known to the directors, and the response must be so deficient that it amounts to conscious inaction. A board that receives a warning, refers it to counsel, investigates and concludes no action is needed has generally done its job, even if the conclusion turns out to be wrong. Delaware protects good-faith judgment; it punishes looking away.
02The red-flag timeline
Five dated items in the published record bear on what the board may have been told. Each is labelled by the kind of source it is. The most important caveat concerns the first: the May 15 notice itself is not among the published exhibits. What the site holds is the complaint's description of it and counsel's repetition of that description in Exhibit D.
Figure 2 · Dated red-flag timeline (select an entry)
Thompson “sent a cease and desist notice to SSC’s board of directors requesting that SSC stop contacting Factor’s employees, advisors, customers, investors, and affiliates” (Complaint ¶ 42; repeated in Exhibit D).
Attorney descriptionAllegation in complaintDelivery / confirmation: The notice itself is not among the published exhibits.
Complaint ¶ 42 →
03Evidence against the legal elements
A Caremark complaint must plead particularized facts, not conclusions, for each element. Mapped against them, the public record is strongest on the existence of a warning and weakest on everything that happened inside the boardroom, which is precisely the part the law cares about.
Figure 3 · Evidence mapped to Caremark elements
| Element | Supported in the record | Unknown / needed |
|---|---|---|
| Oversight system existed (prong 1) | Nothing published | Whether the board had any reporting line on executive conduct toward competitors or former employees |
| Red flag reached directors | Complaint ¶ 42 and Exhibit D say a notice was sent to the board | The notice text, addressees, delivery method, receipt |
| Directors knew of it | No document shows any director read it | Board minutes, board materials, director emails |
| Conscious disregard / bad faith | Complaint says SSC “seemingly took no action” | Whether any inquiry, counsel review or instruction occurred |
| Post-notice conduct continued | ¶ 43 allegation; July 12 screenshot | Authenticated authorship; whether the board was informed |
| Harm to SSC itself | Litigation exposure from the pending federal suit | Any judgment, settlement, cost, or fine; none exists today |
Corporate harm is a separate hurdle. A derivative claim seeks to recover the company's losses. Today SSC faces a lawsuit, not a judgment; legal costs and any eventual liability could become harm, but a pending claim is not yet a measured loss, and Delaware courts often treat oversight claims as unripe until the underlying exposure resolves.
04Who can sue, and how
A Caremark claim belongs to the corporation, so a stockholder brings it derivatively, on the company's behalf. Under 8 Del. C. § 327 the plaintiff must have owned shares when the alleged wrong occurred, and under Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040 (Del. 1984), must keep owning them throughout the case. Employees holding unexercised stock options are not stockholders and lack standing. This analysis assumes SecurityScorecard is a Delaware corporation, as most venture-backed companies are; the site has not independently verified its state of incorporation.
The usual first step is a books-and-records demand under 8 Del. C. § 220. Amendments effective in 2025 (Senate Bill 21) narrowed it: a demand must state a proper purpose and the records sought “with reasonable particularity,” and the statute now defines core “books and records” as items such as board and committee minutes, materials provided to the board, governing documents and certain annual financial statements. Emails and informal communications are generally reachable only if the core records do not exist or are insufficient, and the company may require reasonable confidentiality terms. For this case, the decisive records would be any board minutes or board materials mentioning the May 15 notice.
The stockholder must then either make a demand that the board sue or plead that demand is futile. Under United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Zuckerberg, 262 A.3d 1034 (Del. 2021), demand is excused only if a majority of the board received a material personal benefit, faces a substantial likelihood of liability, or lacks independence from someone who does. In oversight cases, the second question usually decides everything.
Figure 4 · From stockholder to derivative recovery
- 1
Stockholder of record
Owns shares (not unexercised options) when the wrong occurred, and keeps them through the case (8 Del. C. § 327; Lewis v. Anderson).
- 2
§ 220 demand
Written, under oath, stating a proper purpose with reasonable particularity, such as investigating possible mismanagement.
- 3
Demand or futility
Ask the board to sue, or plead with particularity why it cannot impartially decide (Zuckerberg three-part test; Court of Chancery Rule 23.1).
- 4
Derivative complaint
Filed in the corporation's name in the Court of Chancery; survives only if particularized facts support bad faith.
- 5
Corporate recovery
Any damages or settlement go to the company. The stockholder may seek attorneys' fees, not a personal payout.
Any recovery ordinarily goes to the company, not to the stockholder who sued. The stockholder's counsel may be awarded fees; individual stockholders do not receive the damages.
05Exculpation, tenure and bad faith
Most Delaware charters include a provision under 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7) eliminating directors' personal liability for breaches of the duty of care. Under Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075 (Del. 2001), such a provision can end a care-based claim at the outset. It cannot protect breaches of loyalty or acts not in good faith, which is exactly why Caremark is pleaded as bad faith: inattention alone is exculpated; conscious disregard is not.
Long-tenured directors are often discussed in these cases. Years on a board can make a claim that a director knew nothing about recurring issues less persuasive as a matter of fact, because long service implies familiarity with the company and its executives. But tenure alone creates no legal presumption of knowledge or liability. A plaintiff still has to plead what each director was told and how each responded.
06What the board knew, and what is unknown
The honest summary is that the record documents a warning addressed to the board and is silent on what happened next. Silence in a public record is not evidence of inaction; boards rarely publish their deliberations. It is the gap a § 220 demand exists to fill.
Figure 5 · What the board knew vs what remains unknown
Documented
- The complaint and counsel's letter both state a May 15, 2026 notice was sent to the board.
- Counsel's August 10 letter, an original exhibit, was addressed to SSC's outside counsel.
- A federal complaint was filed and is public.
- A screenshot attributed to Mr. Yampolskiy references subpoenas and CPS.
Unknown
- What, if anything, the board discussed, investigated or decided.
- Whether the July 12 message or June 9 report reached the board.
- Whether SSC has suffered compensable corporate harm.
- Where SSC is incorporated and who holds common stock; the site has not verified either.
07Disclosure, response and sources
This site is owned by Jason Thompson, a plaintiff in the federal case against SecurityScorecard. It names no individual director or investor, and alleges no breach of duty by any of them. This article is educational reporting about how Delaware law works. It is not legal advice, does not create an attorney relationship, and is not a solicitation for anyone to bring a claim. Anyone considering one should consult independent Delaware counsel.
Right of response. SecurityScorecard, its board and any director are invited to respond, including to state whether the May 15 notice was received and how it was handled. Substantive responses will be published or summarized fairly alongside this article.
Primary sources
- In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996)
- Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006)
- Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019)
- In re Boeing Co. Derivative Litig., 2021 WL 4059934 (Del. Ch. Sept. 7, 2021)
- In re McDonald’s Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 289 A.3d 343 (Del. Ch. 2023)
- United Food & Com. Workers Union v. Zuckerberg, 262 A.3d 1034 (Del. 2021)
- Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040 (Del. 1984)
- Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075 (Del. 2001)
- 8 Del. C. § 220 · § 102(b)(7) · § 327
- Complaint (text) · Exhibit D (text) · All documents
Related investigations
Investigations · Federal investigation
FBI Launches Formal Probe into SecurityScorecard CEO Aleksandr Yampolskiy
The FBI’s Boston Cyber Task Force interviewed multiple witnesses about Yampolskiy’s alleged access to Bitsight and requested evidence tracing Bitsight material into SecurityScorecard’s product.
Opinion
DOJ Flameout and Yampolskiy’s Criminal Defense Attorney Michael Yaeger Acts Unethically, Then Complains About the Consequences
A day after his firm sent preservation letters to a Factor executive and an advisor, Yampolskiy’s defense attorney Michael Yaeger demanded that the Chronicle come down. His email identified no factual error in the articles he attached.
Opinion
Crooked Michael Margulies Used Preservation Letters to Intimidate Witnesses
On November 19, Carlton Fields attorney Michael D. Margulies emailed a Factor Cybersecurity executive and an advisor at their personal addresses. They were already represented by counsel.
Analysis · Executive accountability
From NS8 to SecurityScorecard: When Cybersecurity Executives Become the Risk
The NS8 scandal exposed fraud and whistleblower retaliation inside a company selling fraud prevention. Allegations in Factor Cybersecurity's federal lawsuit raise a different question: Who holds cybersecurity executives accountable when their own conduct is challenged?
Investigations · Legal Analysis
AleksandrYampolskiy.com: A Masterclass in Leveling the Playing Field Through Asymmetric Advantage
SecurityScorecard's CEO publicly criticized a former executive and his startup. A landmark federal appellate decision involving Jerry Falwell explains why an independent criticism website bearing his name is not unlawful merely for using it, and how modern tools let founders level the playing field.
Analysis · Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
Did Yampolskiy's Alleged Competitor Hacking Cross the Line Drawn by the Supreme Court in Van Buren?
How the Supreme Court’s landmark CFAA decision applies to alleged unauthorized competitor access described in Factor Cybersecurity v. SecurityScorecard, and why valid credentials do not necessarily establish lawful authorization.
Investigations · Litigation
Something to Hide? Yampolskiy's SecurityScorecard Settled Competitor Lawsuit Just 10 Days After Judge Ordered Competitive Intelligence Discovery
SecurityScorecard sued a competitor over alleged improper competitive intelligence gathering. But when a federal judge ordered scrutiny of SecurityScorecard's own practices, the case settled just ten days later. Coincidence, or did the discovery order change everything?
Investigation · Litigation tactics
Drug Use, Threats, and Anonymous Emails: Who Are theothermarkh@proton.me and markh1980ny@gmail.com, and Why Do They Matter to SecurityScorecard & Yampolskiy's Defense?
Two unidentified email accounts. Allegations of antisemitic statements, threats, and drug use in federal litigation involving a longtime SecurityScorecard executive. And the same outside attorney raising questions about anonymous communications in another lawsuit. Is there a recurring litigation strategy, or something more troubling happening inside SecurityScorecard?
Analysis · Litigation exposure
From Unicorn to Firesale: Why Impacted Companies Hold SecurityScorecard’s Death Warrant
If allegations of unauthorized access to competitor platforms were ever corroborated, the leverage would sit with the companies allegedly accessed. A conditional, claim-by-claim look at the civil, criminal, commercial and valuation stakes, with an interactive model.
Litigation · Evidence · Corporate Conduct
Bad Faith: Factor Offered a Code Review to Yampolskiy's Attorneys. It Was Never About IP. This Was About Bullying.
SecurityScorecard was offered multiple opportunities to resolve its concerns, including third-party forensic examination and access to Factor's application codebase. Why did a dispute that could have been investigated privately become a federal lawsuit and a public confrontation?
Analysis · Commentary on the court record
Watching for the Response: In the Heid Lawsuit, SecurityScorecard’s Hired Guns Went Scorched Earth
A former executive alleged his name and altered likeness were used to sell AI products, and that his equity was threatened when he objected. SecurityScorecard answered with two contract counterclaims and a set of personal allegations. One case, read closely, through both filings.
Board Spotlight · Governance
Richard Seewald Promised Billions. The Record Shows a Revolving Door, a 70% Markdown and a Fight SecurityScorecard Didn’t Need
An investor’s thirteen-year bet, a billion-dollar projection, a secondary-market markdown, and the governance test confronting Evolution Equity Partners.
Investigation · Evidence
The Smoking Gun: What Evidence Would Determine If Yampolskiy Hacked Competitors, and Does Factor Have It?
A Slack message, a Dropbox link, an access log, an invoice. What the federal record already holds on alleged competitor access, what discovery would have to establish, and why each link in the chain must stand on its own.
Featured Analysis · Counsel
Yampolskiy Hires White Collar Criminal Defense Attorney. What Does It Signal, and What Is Pro Hac Vice?
October 5 court filing identifies Michael L. Yaeger among three Carlton Fields attorneys representing SecurityScorecard and Aleksandr Yampolskiy.
Featured Analysis · Discovery
Following the Evidence: Emma Mason Furniture, Alleged Cyber Espionage, and Federal Discovery
How a federal trial could confirm or disprove the alleged Emma Mason Furniture hacking scheme and Aleksandr Yampolskiy's involvement.
Analysis · Delaware law
Delaware Stalking and Harassment Laws: Did Repeated Communications Targeting Jason Thompson Cross the Legal Threshold?
What 11 Del. C. §§ 1311 and 1312 actually require, which communications are documented, which are only alleged, and what investigators would need to establish.