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Ownership disclosure: this site is owned by Jason Thompson, a plaintiff in Factor Cybersecurity, Inc. v. SecurityScorecard, Inc. (D. Del., No. 1:2026cv01119). It is not an official source. Allegations are unadjudicated. This is educational reporting, not legal advice or a solicitation.

Analysis · Corporate governance

SecurityScorecard’s Board Was Warned. Could Shareholders Sue Under Caremark?

How Delaware’s Caremark doctrine could expose longtime directors to liability if they ignored warnings of alleged executive misconduct.

9 min readAnalysis · Not legal advice

The federal complaint says that on May 15, 2026, a cease-and-desist notice went to SecurityScorecard's board of directors, and that afterwards the company “seemingly took no action” while the conduct complained of “continued” and “increased” (Complaint ¶ 42). If that is true, it raises a governance question separate from the lawsuit itself: when a board is warned about an executive's conduct and does nothing, can the company's own stockholders hold the directors to account? Delaware's answer runs through a 1996 decision called Caremark. It is a real remedy, and one of the hardest claims in corporate law to win. No court has found any SecurityScorecard director liable for anything, and no such claim has been filed.

01What Caremark actually requires

In In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996), Chancellor Allen held that directors have a duty to make a good-faith attempt to ensure that adequate information and reporting systems exist, and called a claim for breaching it “possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.” A decade later, Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006), placed oversight inside the duty of loyalty and set the two-part test courts still use: directors are liable only if they utterly failed to implement any reporting system, or, having one, consciously failed to monitor it. Either way, the plaintiff must show bad faith: that directors knew they were not discharging their duties.

Figure 1 · The two Caremark prongs (Stone v. Ritter)

Prong 1 · Information systems

Directors “utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system or controls.”

Rarely pleaded successfully. Marchand: no board-level system for food safety, the company's mission-critical risk.

Prong 2 · Red flags

Having a system, directors “consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations,” disabling themselves from being informed of risks.

The usual path when a board is alleged to have received warnings. Requires known red flags and a conscious failure to act.

Both lead to the same element: bad faith → breach of the duty of loyalty → harm to the corporation
Either prong requires bad faith: a knowing failure to act in the face of a known duty to act. Ordinary negligence, even gross negligence, is not enough.

Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019), showed the doctrine has teeth. The Delaware Supreme Court revived claims against Blue Bell's directors because the board had no system for monitoring food safety, the company's central compliance risk, before a deadly listeria outbreak. In re Boeing (Del. Ch. 2021) followed for airplane safety. In re McDonald's, 289 A.3d 343 (Del. Ch. 2023), held that officers owe an oversight duty too, and that red flags about an executive's misconduct toward others can matter.

The second prong, red flags, is the relevant one here. A red flag must be known to the directors, and the response must be so deficient that it amounts to conscious inaction. A board that receives a warning, refers it to counsel, investigates and concludes no action is needed has generally done its job, even if the conclusion turns out to be wrong. Delaware protects good-faith judgment; it punishes looking away.

02The red-flag timeline

Five dated items in the published record bear on what the board may have been told. Each is labelled by the kind of source it is. The most important caveat concerns the first: the May 15 notice itself is not among the published exhibits. What the site holds is the complaint's description of it and counsel's repetition of that description in Exhibit D.

Figure 2 · Dated red-flag timeline (select an entry)

  1. Thompson “sent a cease and desist notice to SSC’s board of directors requesting that SSC stop contacting Factor’s employees, advisors, customers, investors, and affiliates” (Complaint ¶ 42; repeated in Exhibit D).

    Attorney descriptionAllegation in complaint

    Delivery / confirmation: The notice itself is not among the published exhibits.

    Complaint ¶ 42 →
Labels describe the kind of source, not its truth. “Independent confirmation” is absent for every entry: no director, company record or neutral party has confirmed receipt or content.

03Evidence against the legal elements

A Caremark complaint must plead particularized facts, not conclusions, for each element. Mapped against them, the public record is strongest on the existence of a warning and weakest on everything that happened inside the boardroom, which is precisely the part the law cares about.

Figure 3 · Evidence mapped to Caremark elements

ElementSupported in the recordUnknown / needed
Oversight system existed (prong 1)Nothing publishedWhether the board had any reporting line on executive conduct toward competitors or former employees
Red flag reached directorsComplaint ¶ 42 and Exhibit D say a notice was sent to the boardThe notice text, addressees, delivery method, receipt
Directors knew of itNo document shows any director read itBoard minutes, board materials, director emails
Conscious disregard / bad faithComplaint says SSC “seemingly took no action”Whether any inquiry, counsel review or instruction occurred
Post-notice conduct continued¶ 43 allegation; July 12 screenshotAuthenticated authorship; whether the board was informed
Harm to SSC itselfLitigation exposure from the pending federal suitAny judgment, settlement, cost, or fine; none exists today
“Supported” means a published document says it, not that it is proven.

Corporate harm is a separate hurdle. A derivative claim seeks to recover the company's losses. Today SSC faces a lawsuit, not a judgment; legal costs and any eventual liability could become harm, but a pending claim is not yet a measured loss, and Delaware courts often treat oversight claims as unripe until the underlying exposure resolves.

04Who can sue, and how

A Caremark claim belongs to the corporation, so a stockholder brings it derivatively, on the company's behalf. Under 8 Del. C. § 327 the plaintiff must have owned shares when the alleged wrong occurred, and under Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040 (Del. 1984), must keep owning them throughout the case. Employees holding unexercised stock options are not stockholders and lack standing. This analysis assumes SecurityScorecard is a Delaware corporation, as most venture-backed companies are; the site has not independently verified its state of incorporation.

The usual first step is a books-and-records demand under 8 Del. C. § 220. Amendments effective in 2025 (Senate Bill 21) narrowed it: a demand must state a proper purpose and the records sought “with reasonable particularity,” and the statute now defines core “books and records” as items such as board and committee minutes, materials provided to the board, governing documents and certain annual financial statements. Emails and informal communications are generally reachable only if the core records do not exist or are insufficient, and the company may require reasonable confidentiality terms. For this case, the decisive records would be any board minutes or board materials mentioning the May 15 notice.

The stockholder must then either make a demand that the board sue or plead that demand is futile. Under United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Zuckerberg, 262 A.3d 1034 (Del. 2021), demand is excused only if a majority of the board received a material personal benefit, faces a substantial likelihood of liability, or lacks independence from someone who does. In oversight cases, the second question usually decides everything.

Figure 4 · From stockholder to derivative recovery

  1. 1

    Stockholder of record

    Owns shares (not unexercised options) when the wrong occurred, and keeps them through the case (8 Del. C. § 327; Lewis v. Anderson).

  2. 2

    § 220 demand

    Written, under oath, stating a proper purpose with reasonable particularity, such as investigating possible mismanagement.

  3. 3

    Demand or futility

    Ask the board to sue, or plead with particularity why it cannot impartially decide (Zuckerberg three-part test; Court of Chancery Rule 23.1).

  4. 4

    Derivative complaint

    Filed in the corporation's name in the Court of Chancery; survives only if particularized facts support bad faith.

  5. 5

    Corporate recovery

    Any damages or settlement go to the company. The stockholder may seek attorneys' fees, not a personal payout.

Any recovery ordinarily goes to the company, not to the stockholder who sued. The stockholder's counsel may be awarded fees; individual stockholders do not receive the damages.

05Exculpation, tenure and bad faith

Most Delaware charters include a provision under 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7) eliminating directors' personal liability for breaches of the duty of care. Under Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075 (Del. 2001), such a provision can end a care-based claim at the outset. It cannot protect breaches of loyalty or acts not in good faith, which is exactly why Caremark is pleaded as bad faith: inattention alone is exculpated; conscious disregard is not.

Long-tenured directors are often discussed in these cases. Years on a board can make a claim that a director knew nothing about recurring issues less persuasive as a matter of fact, because long service implies familiarity with the company and its executives. But tenure alone creates no legal presumption of knowledge or liability. A plaintiff still has to plead what each director was told and how each responded.

06What the board knew, and what is unknown

The honest summary is that the record documents a warning addressed to the board and is silent on what happened next. Silence in a public record is not evidence of inaction; boards rarely publish their deliberations. It is the gap a § 220 demand exists to fill.

Figure 5 · What the board knew vs what remains unknown

Documented

  • The complaint and counsel's letter both state a May 15, 2026 notice was sent to the board.
  • Counsel's August 10 letter, an original exhibit, was addressed to SSC's outside counsel.
  • A federal complaint was filed and is public.
  • A screenshot attributed to Mr. Yampolskiy references subpoenas and CPS.

Unknown

  • What, if anything, the board discussed, investigated or decided.
  • Whether the July 12 message or June 9 report reached the board.
  • Whether SSC has suffered compensable corporate harm.
  • Where SSC is incorporated and who holds common stock; the site has not verified either.

07Disclosure, response and sources

This site is owned by Jason Thompson, a plaintiff in the federal case against SecurityScorecard. It names no individual director or investor, and alleges no breach of duty by any of them. This article is educational reporting about how Delaware law works. It is not legal advice, does not create an attorney relationship, and is not a solicitation for anyone to bring a claim. Anyone considering one should consult independent Delaware counsel.

Right of response. SecurityScorecard, its board and any director are invited to respond, including to state whether the May 15 notice was received and how it was handled. Substantive responses will be published or summarized fairly alongside this article.

Primary sources

  • In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996)
  • Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006)
  • Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019)
  • In re Boeing Co. Derivative Litig., 2021 WL 4059934 (Del. Ch. Sept. 7, 2021)
  • In re McDonald’s Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 289 A.3d 343 (Del. Ch. 2023)
  • United Food & Com. Workers Union v. Zuckerberg, 262 A.3d 1034 (Del. 2021)
  • Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040 (Del. 1984)
  • Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075 (Del. 2001)
  • 8 Del. C. § 220 · § 102(b)(7) · § 327
  • Complaint (text) · Exhibit D (text) · All documents

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