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Investigations · Litigation

Something to Hide? Yampolskiy's SecurityScorecard Settled Competitor Lawsuit Just 10 Days After Judge Ordered Competitive Intelligence Discovery

SecurityScorecard sued a competitor over alleged improper competitive intelligence gathering. But when a federal judge ordered scrutiny of SecurityScorecard's own practices, the case settled just ten days later. Coincidence, or did the discovery order change everything?

12 min readInvestigations · Litigation
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In June 2024, SecurityScorecard, led by its co-founder and chief executive Aleksandr Yampolskiy, went to federal court in Manhattan and accused a competitor of cheating. Its complaint against a competing cyber-risk company said the rival had improperly gathered competitive intelligence: trade secrets carried out the door by a departing employee, access to SecurityScorecard's platform, customer data, and job interviews that were, in SecurityScorecard's telling, a pretext for extracting confidential business information from its people. The company called it "unlawful skullduggery and unfair competition."

Fifteen months later, the case was over. On September 5, 2025, U.S. District Judge Edgardo Ramos granted the competitor's motion to compel discovery on ten contested document requests, requests aimed not at the competitor's conduct but at SecurityScorecard's own competitive-intelligence practices. On September 15, the court entered an order stating it had been "advised that all claims asserted herein have been settled." Ten days separated the ruling that would have opened SecurityScorecard's methods to inspection from the end of the lawsuit SecurityScorecard itself had filed.

That sequence raises an obvious question. Was SecurityScorecard more concerned about what its own files would show than about pursuing the conduct it had accused the competitor of? The record does not answer it. Settlement terms were not made public, neither side has explained its reasons, and nothing in the docket shows that the discovery order caused the settlement. But the timing is a matter of record, and it deserves a hard look.

01SecurityScorecard Went on the Offensive

The case, SecurityScorecard, Inc. v. [competitor], No. 1:24-cv-04240, was filed in the Southern District of New York on June 4, 2024 (docket; CourtListener). It named two defendants: a competing cyber-risk company and Mary Polyakova, a former SecurityScorecard employee who had gone to work there. SecurityScorecard sued under the Defend Trade Secrets Act and sought emergency relief on the day it filed, supported by declarations and a set of exhibits that included its user agreement, its employee handbook, its acceptable-use policy and an exchange of cease-and-desist letters from May 2024 (Doc. 13).

According to the complaint, Polyakova took customer and prospect lists containing roughly 9,300 entries, information SecurityScorecard said it had invested some $40 million to compile. The complaint also alleged that the competitor had improperly accessed SecurityScorecard's platform and had used interviews with SecurityScorecard employees to draw out confidential business information. These were SecurityScorecard's allegations. They were never tested at trial, and no court found that the competitor or Polyakova did what the complaint described.

The lawsuit was, in other words, a case about competitive intelligence: who may look at a rival's product, how, and through whom. SecurityScorecard chose that ground. It would soon discover that the ground ran in both directions.

SecurityScorecard chose to litigate competitive intelligence. It soon found that the question ran in both directions.

02The Competitor Turned the Investigation Around

The competitor's defense went to the heart of SecurityScorecard's theory. If gathering information about a competitor was wrongful, the competitor argued in effect, then how SecurityScorecard gathered information about its competitors mattered too. The competitor requested records about SecurityScorecard's internal research on the competitor, its access to and evaluation of the competitor's products, its recruiting of and interviews with employees, its communications on those subjects, and its competitive-intelligence practices more generally.

SecurityScorecard resisted. The parties fought over ten document requests, and the competitor moved to compel. The relevance of those records is not hard to see. A plaintiff that asks a court for an injunction, an equitable remedy, invites the defense of unclean hands: the doctrine that a party seeking equity must not itself have engaged in comparable misconduct related to the dispute. If SecurityScorecard had done to the competitor something like what it accused the competitor of doing to it, that would bear directly on whether a court should grant SecurityScorecard the relief it wanted.

By that point SecurityScorecard had changed lawyers. In January 2025, Carlton Fields substituted as lead counsel, and its shareholder Michael D. Margulies wrote to Judge Ramos that the firm hoped to "narrow the disputed discovery issues" (Jan. 17, 2025 letter). Margulies is one of the Carlton Fields lawyers now representing SecurityScorecard and Yampolskiy against Factor in Delaware (motion; our earlier report).

03September 5, 2025: The Judge Orders Discovery

On September 5, 2025, Judge Ramos granted the competitor's motion to compel on the ten contested requests. The ruling is narrow in one important sense and significant in another. It did not find that SecurityScorecard had done anything wrong. A discovery order decides only that information is relevant to the claims or defenses and proportional to the needs of the case, so that the other side is entitled to see it. That is all this order decided.

But that decision matters. It meant the court accepted that SecurityScorecard's own competitive-intelligence activity, to the extent it resembled the conduct SecurityScorecard was suing over, was fair game in a case where SecurityScorecard sought equitable remedies, including an injunction. The records SecurityScorecard had fought to keep out of the case would now have to be produced.

Production would not have meant publication. In October 2024 the parties had entered a stipulated confidentiality agreement and protective order (Doc. 120), which let either side designate sensitive records as confidential and limit who could see them. Documents produced under such an order do not become public automatically. They would, however, have gone to the competitor's lawyers, the very competitor SecurityScorecard had accused of improper intelligence gathering, and some could have surfaced in later motions or at trial.

The court did not find wrongdoing. It found that SecurityScorecard's own practices were relevant, and ordered them produced.

04Ten Days Later, the Lawsuit Was Settled

Ten days · September 2025

Fri

Sept 5

Court order

Mon

Sept 15

Settled

Sept. 5, 2025 · Ruling

Judge Edgardo Ramos grants the competitor's motion to compel on ten contested document requests about SecurityScorecard's own competitive-intelligence practices (order).

Sept. 15, 2025 · Settlement

"The Court having been advised that all claims asserted herein have been settled," the case is discontinued (Doc. 178). On Oct. 17, 2025, SecurityScorecard files a voluntary dismissal with prejudice (Doc. 180, docket).

Dates from the court record. The timing is documented; the reason for the settlement is not.

On September 15, 2025, ten days after the ruling, Judge Ramos signed an order reciting that the court had been "advised that all claims asserted herein have been settled" and discontinuing the action, subject to reopening if the settlement was not consummated within thirty days. On October 17, 2025, SecurityScorecard filed a notice voluntarily dismissing the case with prejudice against both the competitor and Polyakova (Doc. 180), meaning the claims cannot be brought again.

No settlement terms appear on the public docket. Neither company has said why it settled, what, if anything, changed hands, or whether the compelled records were ever produced. Settlements happen for many reasons, and this article does not claim to know SecurityScorecard's.

Still, the question asks itself. A company that had sued a competitor for improper intelligence gathering, sought emergency relief and litigated for fifteen months reached a settlement of all claims within ten days of being ordered to open its own intelligence practices to that same competitor. Did the obligation to disclose its methods change SecurityScorecard's calculation? On the public record, that remains a hypothesis. It is a reasonable one to ask.

05What Did SecurityScorecard Have to Lose?

Requests of the kind the competitor described can reach a wide range of material: the methods a company uses to study competitors, the employees who do that work, the accounts used to access competing products, internal research and comparison documents, any outside intermediaries involved, and the operational records that show who did what and when. This article does not know which of those categories the ten compelled requests actually covered, and it does not claim that any specific record was ordered produced beyond what the order itself states.

What is clear is that such material is commercially sensitive even under a protective order. Confidentiality designations limit who sees documents. They do not stop the opposing side's lawyers from reading them, building arguments from them, or asking the court to unseal them. For a security company whose business depends on how it gathers and presents information about other companies, an inventory of its own competitive-intelligence practices handed to a rival would be an exposure in itself, whatever it showed.

There are other explanations for the settlement, and fairness requires naming them. Litigation is expensive; SecurityScorecard had replaced its lead counsel mid-case; the parties may have reached a business accommodation; the competitor may have offered terms SecurityScorecard found acceptable; or both sides may simply have decided that continuing was not worth the cost. Any of those could account for the result. None is excluded by the record, and none is confirmed by it.

06The Factor Lawsuit Introduces a More Serious Set of Allegations

In September 2026, Factor Cybersecurity and Jason Thompson sued SecurityScorecard and Yampolskiy in the District of Delaware (No. 1:26-cv-01119). Factor's complaint goes further than anything SecurityScorecard alleged against the competitor. It alleges that Yampolskiy told Thompson he had paid individuals for nonpublic information about competitors, that competitor information circulated inside the company, and that Yampolskiy logged in to a competitor's platform from his office computer through a VPN, as did other SecurityScorecard employees (Compl. ¶¶ 24–26; the VPN allegation is at ¶ 25). Plaintiff-supplied text messages in The Record separately describe an alleged "Emma Mason" account used to reach a competitor's systems (our analysis).

Factor's account is that the retaliation escalated after Factor and Thompson helped disrupt that alleged access campaign: that SecurityScorecard and Yampolskiy then turned on Factor with false statements to its employees, partners and prospects and a July 14, 2026 demand letter claiming Factor's name and technology (Compl. ¶¶ 1–2, 27, 48–49). The dispute over the name itself began earlier: SecurityScorecard filed trademark applications for FACTOR marks in July 2025, shortly after Thompson resigned and before the alleged access campaign was shut down (Compl. ¶ 2). These are Factor's allegations. SecurityScorecard disputes Factor's account, no court has ruled on them, and no criminal charge has been filed against anyone.

If those allegations are tested, the evidence that matters will be the same kind the competitor was pursuing: contemporaneous internal records. Who authorized access to competing platforms, and for what purpose; what the communications around it said; whether outside parties were involved; and what changed inside the company once the alleged access was discovered and stopped. Motive and timing, the questions at the core of a retaliation claim, are answered by documents written at the time, not by recollection after the fact.

07Why the Competitor Discovery Decision Matters to Factor

A discovery order in the Southern District of New York does not bind a federal court in Delaware. Each court applies the same federal rules to its own case, its own claims and its own record, and a ruling in one says nothing certain about the outcome in another. Factor's case also differs in kind: the competitor's interest in SecurityScorecard's practices arose from an unclean-hands defense, while Factor's allegations about access to competitors are part of its own account of why it was targeted.

What the competitor order does show is that a federal judge, presented with SecurityScorecard's objections, found records of its competitive-intelligence practices discoverable when they bore on the issues in a case. Factor's allegations put similar questions in play. Who directed access to competitor systems? Did vendor or intermediary arrangements exist? What do access logs and internal communications show? How did behavior change after complaints were raised internally and to the board? Those are discovery questions, and the competitor litigation is an example, though no guarantee, of how a court may treat them.

The Delaware court is not bound by the competitor ruling. But it is not the first court to be asked what SecurityScorecard's own files contain.

08Did SecurityScorecard's Own Lawsuit Create a Discovery Problem?

There is an irony in how the competitor case unfolded. SecurityScorecard's theory was that competitive intelligence can cross a line: that accessing a rival's platform, mining its former employees and interviewing its staff can amount to misappropriation and unfair competition. Having made that argument, SecurityScorecard could hardly object that its own conduct in the same field was irrelevant. The more forcefully a plaintiff defines wrongful intelligence gathering, the more its own practices become the obvious point of comparison.

That dynamic is not unusual, and it is not evidence of wrongdoing. Plaintiffs often discover that suing opens their own records to scrutiny, and many settle for reasons that have nothing to do with what those records contain. A confidential settlement is not an admission, and this article does not treat it as one. But a company that sued to police competitive intelligence, and then settled shortly after a court ordered it to account for its own, has left the public with a question it has never addressed.

09The Question That Won't Go Away

The documented timeline is short. June 4, 2024: SecurityScorecard sues the competitor over alleged improper competitive intelligence. October 16, 2024: a protective order governs confidential discovery. September 5, 2025: Judge Ramos compels discovery into SecurityScorecard's own practices. September 15, 2025: the court is advised that all claims have settled. October 17, 2025: SecurityScorecard dismisses the case with prejudice.

The hypothesis is equally simple, and it remains unproven: that the prospect of opening its competitive-intelligence files to a rival weighed on SecurityScorecard's decision to end a case it had started. A year later, Factor's lawsuit alleges conduct of a far more serious kind, and if that case reaches discovery, the same category of records is likely to be at issue again.

The unresolved question is not simply why SecurityScorecard settled with the competitor. It is what a thorough examination of SecurityScorecard's competitive intelligence operations might reveal, and whether the Factor litigation will finally provide those answers.

Primary documents and docket citations

This investigation is published from the perspective of Factor founder Jason Thompson, a plaintiff in ongoing litigation against SecurityScorecard and Aleksandr Yampolskiy. Court rulings and procedural events are distinguished from allegations, inferences and unresolved questions.

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