BreakingFBI Launches Formal Probe into SecurityScorecard CEO Aleksandr Yampolskiy
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Ownership disclosure: this site is owned by Jason Thompson, a plaintiff in Factor Cybersecurity, Inc. v. SecurityScorecard, Inc. (D. Del., No. 1:2026cv01119). It is not an official source. Allegations are unadjudicated. This is analysis, not legal or investment advice.

Board Spotlight · Governance

Richard Seewald Promised Billions. The Record Shows a Revolving Door, a 70% Markdown and a Fight SecurityScorecard Didn’t Need

An investor’s thirteen-year bet, a billion-dollar projection, a secondary-market markdown, and the governance test confronting Evolution Equity Partners.

18 min readAnalysis

SecurityScorecard's central governance question is not why its chief executive became entangled in a dispute with a pre-commercial startup in 2026 (docket). It is why a company founded in 2013 (SSC), funded through six rounds and once valued around a billion dollars (Forge), had been confronted for years with accounts of disruptive leadership (Glassdoor, 2016) and recurring executive turnover, yet continued to treat fundraising and promotional momentum as evidence of operational strength. When venture capital changed after 2021 (NVCA), that distinction mattered. Against that longer history, the decision to press an intellectual-property dispute with Factor raises a basic boardroom question: what measurable benefit did the fight offer SecurityScorecard, its investors and enterprise customers?

For director and early investor Richard Seewald, this is a test of the operating expertise and board independence Evolution Equity Partners has repeatedly promoted (Evolution; TechCrunch). Evolution wrote the first check and, in his words, “doubled and tripled down” (Evolution; video). Did executives and directors confront recurring evidence of operational weakness, or did a longstanding investment and founder relationship make intervention more difficult? The record establishes warnings and executive transitions; only board records can establish the directors' actual responses and motives.

A company that churns through two CMOs, three CPOs, three CTOs, three CROs, three CFOs, three general counsels, two CHROs and two presidents in three years is the definition of troubled.

01The promise versus the mark

SecurityScorecard's priced rounds climbed for eight years: $6.6 million post-money at the 2013 seed, then $49.02 million (2015), $104.66 million (2016), $187.72 million (2017), $396.38 million (2019) and about $1.04 billion at the March 2021 Series E (StockAnalysis; Forge Global; Investing.com). Price per share rose from about $0.14 to $5.05.

Figure 1 · SecurityScorecard, 2013–2026: three layers on one timeline

●Tap or hover any dot for its source

Post-money valuation rises from $6.6 million at the November 2013 seed to about $1.04 billion at the March 2021 Series E; the current valuation is undisclosed. Round price per share rises from $0.14 to $5.05; 2026 secondary indications are about $1.53 and $1.52, for potentially different securities. Event flags mark reported layoffs in 2024 and 2026, the October 2025 promotion video, the April 2026 Forrester placement, the May 2026 notice Factor says was sent to the board, the September 2026 lawsuit and the September 2026 appointment of a new President.20132014201520162017201820192020202120222023202420252026Layer 3 · Post-money valuation, primary rounds$0$400M$800M$1.2B2026 implied ~$315.00M (est.)$1.04B × ($1.53 ÷ $5.05)Seed $6.6MSeries A $49.02MSeries B $104.66MSeries C $187.72MSeries D $396.38MSeries E $1.04BLayer 2 · Dated events1234567891011Layer 1 · Price per share: $5.05 in 2021 → ~$1.53 in 2026 (−70%)$0$1$2$3$4$5$0.14$0.63$1.03$1.49$2.71$5.05using best available public data~$1.53 indicative
  1. 1Sep 27, 2016 · Employee accounts; HR reply: leadership “need to change” (Anonymous review with the company's own reply; Glassdoor)
  2. 2Mar 18, 2021 · Evolution: “Seed Round to Series E”; CEO: “10X+” (Public LinkedIn post; aspiration, not achieved return; LinkedIn)
  3. 3Jan 15, 2024 · Layoffs reported (Reported by TrueUp; not independently verified; Site timeline)
  4. 4Apr 15, 2024 · Layoffs reported (Reported by TrueUp; not independently verified; Site timeline)
  5. 5Apr 16, 2024 · Seewald: boards “enhancing accountability” (First-party interview, TechCrunch; TechCrunch)
  6. 6Oct 14, 2025 · Seewald: “multi billion dollar business” forecast (Posted October 2025; recording date unknown; LinkedIn post)
  7. 7Apr 9, 2026 · Forrester: Strong Performer (Analyst report; Site timeline)
  8. 8May 15, 2026 · Claimed board notice (Sent to the board, per Factor; Complaint ¶ 42)
  9. 9May 20, 2026 · Layoffs reported (Reported by TrueUp; not independently verified; Site timeline)
  10. 10Sep 3, 2026 · Factor lawsuit (Federal complaint filed; Docket)
  11. 11Sep 9, 2026 · Walker named President (Company announcement; Company release)
PromotionOperatingLitigation (alleged)
Methodology. Top layer: post-money valuations of primary financing rounds as listed by StockAnalysis and Forge Global, cross-checked against the company's round announcements (A, B, C, D) and a 2021 press report. The 2026 point is this site's estimate: the Series E valuation scaled by the fall in share price to the ~$1.53 secondary indication (about $315M), assuming an unchanged share count. It is not a published valuation. Middle layer: dated events with their evidentiary status. Bottom layer: publicly listed price per share for each primary round (preferred stock), with 2026 secondary-market indications from Clarity via StockAnalysis (Sept. 26, 2026) and a Hiive model-derived figure. Secondary indications may reflect a different share class, rights, liquidity and capitalization, and are not executed trades known to this site. Caplight's current mark was not accessible. The gap between $5.05 and $1.53 is about −69.7%. All three layers share one time axis.

No round has been announced since, and no 2026 company valuation is published. Indicative private secondary pricing is about $1.53 a share (Clarity via StockAnalysis, Sept. 26, 2026) and near $1.52 on Hiive's model: roughly 70 percent below the 2021 preferred price on a nominal comparison of unlike shares. Applying that drop to the $1.04 billion Series E valuation implies a company value of roughly $315 million, this site's estimate from public data, assuming the share count has not changed (StockAnalysis; Forge). One data provider's model, at $359.5 million, lands in the same range (PrivateMarketView).

That gap is where the October 2025 interview sits. Mr. Seewald says: “we anticipate that over the next couple of years you're gonna see security scorecard scale and grow into a multi billion dollar business” (video; transcript post). Evolution's account commented: “Great work Aleksandr Yampolskiy, Sam Kassoumeh and the entire SecurityScorecard team!” (LinkedIn).

Reality check
By October 2025, the warnings were no longer only about operations or the CEO. Market signals pointed to a financial problem large enough to threaten the company’s future. Its longest-serving investor-director forecast billions anyway.

02The first check

Mr. Seewald founded Evolution in 2008; the firm promises deep operating support from “idea to IPO” (Evolution bio; Evolution). SecurityScorecard lists him as a director (leadership page). In March 2021 Evolution announced it had “backed SecurityScorecard from leading the Seed Round to Series E,” and Mr. Yampolskiy thanked Mr. Seewald and two colleagues for the company's “very first check,” adding: “looking forward to delivering 10X+ on this round again!” (LinkedIn). That was an aspiration. The exchange documents a long personal and economic alignment between founder and first investor. Evolution still lists the company as “Active” and “Early Growth” (portfolio).

03The warnings were there from the beginning. Why did oversight fail to resolve them?

The public record of SecurityScorecard's operating culture does not begin with Factor. It begins almost as soon as employees could write about it. The earliest retrievable critical accounts date from 2016; before then, a December 2015 review is positive (Glassdoor). What makes the 2016 accounts more than anonymous complaints is that the company answered them. Its new head of People and Culture wrote that leadership knew it needed to change and was open to it (Glassdoor). A month later, another reply pledged changed behavior after a reviewer described mistreatment by the CEO (Glassdoor).

Figure 4 · Ten years of public accounts, and the company's own replies

  1. Dec 18, 2015 · Positive account

    A positive review describes early growth with a culture still developing (Glassdoor).

  2. Sep 27, 2016 · Account + company reply

    An “Honest Review” describes overwork, burnout and staff being replaced. A later company reply from the new VP of People and Culture, Trent Blanchard, says he researched the issues before arriving: “They know they need to change and are open to it” (Glassdoor).

  3. Oct 15, 2016 · Account + company reply

    “Hot Space, Poor Execution” alleges mistreatment by the CEO; the VP of People replies with a pledge to change behavior (Glassdoor).

  4. Oct 2017 · Account + company reply

    Another negative account, again answered by company HR (Glassdoor).

  5. Nov 2019 · Positive account

    A favorable review notes a new CMO, CTO, CFO and VP of Engineering, a wholesale leadership renovation during growth (Glassdoor).

  6. Apr 2020 · Anonymous account

    A reviewer criticizes multiple successive executive departures (Glassdoor).

  7. Mar 2021 · Anonymous account

    The month of the $1.04 billion round, a reviewer describes a “rotating door of leadership” and product problems (Glassdoor; Forge).

  8. Oct 2022 · Account + company reply

    A field-sales reviewer raises retention and sales-practice concerns; the company responds (Glassdoor).

  9. Feb 2023 · Account + company reply

    A reviewer alleges executive and employee turnover, layoffs and CEO conduct; the company replies that leadership takes reviews seriously and works with HR (Glassdoor).

  10. 2023 · Platform notice

    Glassdoor displays a notice that someone attempted to inflate the employer's rating. It does not say who (Glassdoor).

Anonymous reviews are unverified accounts, not findings. Company replies are the company's own words. Positive reviews are included; SecurityScorecard's aggregate rating is currently shown as 3.8 out of 5 (Glassdoor).

The second pattern is the one boards can count: who runs the company under the CEO. Public releases, executives' own announcements and career records show the product, revenue, finance, technology and marketing functions each changing hands repeatedly since 2020, several of them more than once in four years. Some changes were clearly upgrades, and a growing company should hire more senior people. But the pattern has a constant. The CEO survives every organizational reset.

Figure 3 · The revolving door: senior leadership changes around a constant CEO, 2013–2026

Showing latest years
201320142015201620172018201920202021202220232024202520262027

CEO

Product

Revenue

Finance

Technology

Marketing

Legal

People

President

Tap or hover a name for its dates and sources. At least 15 role changes across product, revenue, finance, technology, marketing, legal and people; one CEO since 2013.

Method. Each line is one person's tenure in a role as shown in public sources, chiefly LinkedIn profiles, company releases and press reports. Actual dates may differ from those sources. Solid ends are dated by a company release or the person's own announcement; dashed lines mark approximate or third-party dates. An open end means no departure date is public. Overlaps (for example in revenue leadership) may reflect different titles. This is not a turnover rate, and it does not say why anyone left. Select a name for its sources.

Why didn't money force the issue earlier? In this site's interpretation, it didn't have to. Through 2021, venture capital was abundant, and a company that could raise its next round could treat turnover as a cost of growth. In 2022 that changed: industry fundraising, valuations and exits retrenched (NVCA / PitchBook). From then on, operating problems are harder to paper over with the next round. The evidence cannot prove that cheap money caused the governance problems; it shows that they were visible before and after capital got expensive. The company achieved real customer growth and six financings, and many employees rate it well (Glassdoor). The question is whether the board treated growth as a substitute for operating discipline.

04The sunk-cost and exit-option problem

“Doubled and tripled down” describes a strategy with consequences (transcript post). An investor who entered at every round holds several positions at different prices. Against the 2026 indication, a seed share bought near $0.14 is nominally up about 10.9 times; a Series E share at $5.05 is nominally down about 70 percent.

Figure 2 · Who is up and who is down? What $1 invested in each round looks like at today’s indicated price

Investors who bought early paid pennies a share; later investors paid dollars. Each row starts at the price paid in that round (white dot) and runs to today's indicated price, about $1.53 (dashed line). Gold rows are investors who are ahead on paper. Red rows are investors who are behind. The same company can make its earliest backer look like a winner while its 2021 investors are down.

Today’s indicated price ~$1.53$0.1$0.5$1$2$5Seed (2013)$0.14$1 → ~$10.93 (ahead)Series A (2015)$0.63$1 → ~$2.43 (ahead)Series B (2016)$1.03$1 → ~$1.49 (ahead)Series C (2017)$1.49$1 → ~$1.03 (ahead)Series D (2019)$2.71$1 → ~$0.56 (-44%)Series E (2021)$5.05$1 → ~$0.30 (-70%)
How to read it. “$1 → ~$10.93” means each dollar paid per share in that round corresponds to about $10.93 at today’s indicated price. Each line runs from a round's publicly listed price per share (Forge Global; StockAnalysis) to the ~$1.53 2026 secondary indication (StockAnalysis/Clarity; Hiive). Log scale. These are simple price comparisons only: they ignore share class, liquidation preferences, dilution, fees and timing, and are not fund returns, IRRs or realized gains. This site does not know which rounds or classes any Evolution fund holds or in what amounts.

Those positions pull in different directions. Early-fund paper gains depend on an exit at a good price; late-round exposure can turn an early win into a blended disappointment. A fund that invested in 2013 is well into its life, and its investors expect distributions. One public commenter on the October 2025 post, Andreas Geyr, wrote: “then let's hope that this success finally results in a relevant exit of our Evolution Fund 1” (LinkedIn). It is one comment, and this site has not verified the commenter's status. But it states the tension plainly: an investor-director has reason to defend the founder's story, and the board has reason to show it can still intervene.

05A costly fight with a pre-commercial startup

On July 21, 2025, SecurityScorecard filed an intent-to-use application for “FACTOR CYBERSECURITY” (Serial No. 99294626) (application record; USPTO office action). Factor, a startup formed in 2021, disputes the company's claimed rights and alleges the filings were part of a retaliatory campaign; the dispute is now in federal court (docket; BankInfoSecurity; case timeline). The mark has not been granted, and this site located no product SecurityScorecard has launched under that name. The company does market its own detection-and-response offering, SCDR (Business Wire), so markets may touch. The question is why taking the name of another company's brand materially advances SecurityScorecard's product strategy.

The complaint goes further. As reported by BankInfoSecurity, it alleges that SecurityScorecard or its CEO obtained competitor information improperly, naming firms including Bitsight, Black Kite and Panorays (BankInfoSecurity; complaint; analysis). Those are pleaded allegations; nothing published shows that any SecurityScorecard product incorporates another company's information. But they create a provenance question that enterprise buyers and regulators care about, and litigation brings discovery.

Which brings the question back to the boardroom. Factor has no commercial product and no revenue, so no immediate sales were at stake. An IP claim can be legitimate if substantiated. A board approving this fight would want an objective corporate benefit, independent legal review and an evidence chain, and it would want independent forensics to rule out the provenance allegations before inviting discovery. Factor's complaint says a written cease-and-desist was sent to the board on May 15, 2026 (Complaint ¶ 42; Exhibit D). What the directors did with it is not public.

06His own governance standard

In April 2024, after Evolution closed a $1.1 billion Fund III (release), Mr. Seewald told TechCrunch the firm “is committed to integrating material environmental, social and governance (ESG) criteria in its investment processes and ownership practices,” and works with portfolio companies on diverse boards, “reducing the risk of groupthink and enhancing accountability” (TechCrunch). Evolution says it has raised more than $2 billion (Evolution bio), and it has successful exits elsewhere. Fund III is a separate vehicle; this site does not suggest it holds SecurityScorecard.

Mr. Seewald does not need to be measured against an outsider's idea of good governance. He has stated his own. Delaware sets a high bar for liability: under Stone v. Ritter, directors must have utterly failed to implement reporting systems or consciously ignored red flags (opinion), and Marchand v. Barnhill applies that to a company's central risks (opinion). Falling share prices and a board's preference for its founder do not establish bad faith, and an investor-director's positions across rounds are an inherent conflict, not self-dealing. The Caremark analysis sets out what a stockholder would have to plead. The standard Mr. Seewald set for himself is higher than the legal floor, and that is the one this article applies.

Figure 5 · What is documented, indicated, alleged and unknown

Documented

  • Mr. Seewald founded and leads Evolution Equity Partners and sits on SSC's board (Evolution bio; SSC leadership page).
  • Primary-round prices rose from $0.14 (2013) to $5.05 (2021) (Forge; StockAnalysis).
  • A public October 2025 post quotes him predicting a “multi-billion dollar business” (LinkedIn).
  • Factor filed suit in September 2026 (docket).

Indicated, not verified

Alleged

Unknown

  • SSC's current valuation; what the board discussed; whether any independent investigation occurred; any conflicted benefit to any director.
Each item is placed by the strength of its public support, not by its importance. Items move up only when new evidence is published.

07Founder pedigree: founding versus exiting

Look at where the founders' résumés actually lead. Aleksandr Yampolskiy's top job before SecurityScorecard was CTO of BlogTalkRadio/Cinchcast, a podcasting startup that raised a modest $6 million Series B in 2011 (PR Newswire), shut down its Cinch.fm product in 2012 for lack of "engineering and product resources" (shutdown notice), and ceased operating BlogTalkRadio on January 31, 2025 (BlogTalkRadio; Wikipedia). His other leadership post was CISO of Gilt, where Sam Kassoumeh was also a security leader (leadership page; SecurityScorecard, “2025 Culture Deck” (company PDF; not linked because the cited version could not be verified)). Gilt, once reportedly valued near $1 billion, sold in 2016 for about $250 million (TechCrunch; Washington Post; Bizjournals), a sharply negative outcome in one of the strongest venture markets on record. Neither founder ran either company, and neither caused those results. But the pattern matters: the public record shows no prior role for either founder as CEO, or in a company-wide executive seat, at a business that went on to succeed. They were handed a venture-backed company to run without ever having been part of a winning one at the top. That is precisely the gap an investor promising "idea to IPO" mentorship, and a board seat, exists to fill.

08Why this extends beyond one portfolio company

Governance failures don't stay inside one company. They spread. A venture firm's reputation is built board seat by board seat, and when one of its most visible seats sits over a revolving door of executives, a roughly 70% market markdown and a public, founder-led legal fight, the damage can travel to everything else the firm touches. Limited partners deciding whether to back the next fund ask what the directors saw and when they acted. Founders choosing between term sheets ask whether this board would protect them or the CEO. Enterprise buyers of Evolution's other cybersecurity holdings ask whether the same oversight sits behind those products. A public display of weak governance can sour the rest of the portfolio by association and narrow future deal flow, whether or not anything is wrong elsewhere. That risk is sharper here because SecurityScorecard sells trust in other companies' security; its board's conduct is part of the product (counsel analysis). This site makes no claim of wrongdoing at any other Evolution holding. Evolution's 2024 fundraise shows a firm with real capacity (release), and that is exactly what is at stake.

09Questions only board records can answer

1

Turnover reviews

When each CPO, CRO, CFO, CTO and CMO left, did the board receive exit findings, and did any review examine the CEO's role in recruiting and retaining senior leaders?

2

The 2016 acknowledgment

The company's own HR leader wrote that leadership knew it needed to change. What did the board require, and how was change measured?

3

Litigation benefit

What measurable benefit to SecurityScorecard did directors identify before the company pressed its dispute with Factor, a startup without a commercial product? Who approved the strategy, and with what budget?

4

Provenance audit

Before the case opened the company to discovery, did independent forensics rule out the complaint's allegations about how competitor information was obtained?

5

Minutes and agendas

Do board minutes from May through September 2026 record the notice Factor describes, the allegations, or the lawsuit? These are core records under 8 Del. C. § 220.

6

Independent counsel and recusals

Did directors without ties to management or early-round investors retain independent counsel, and did anyone recuse because of personal or fund-level interests?

7

Valuation and exit discussions

Do board or investment-committee records discuss valuation, financing or exit options in light of the turnover and the allegations?

This is a business interpretation that the records above could confirm or refute. A board that tracked the turnover, acted on its own HR leader's 2016 warning, and independently tested the Factor fight before approving it would have met Mr. Seewald's stated standard.

10Disclosure, response and sources

This site is owned by Jason Thompson, a plaintiff in the federal case against SecurityScorecard and Aleksandr Yampolskiy. Nothing here alleges that Mr. Seewald, Evolution or any director committed fraud, engaged in self-dealing, acted in bad faith or breached a duty, that SecurityScorecard is insolvent, or that Mr. Yampolskiy committed a crime. This is analysis, not legal or investment advice.

Right of response. Mr. Seewald, Evolution Equity Partners, SecurityScorecard and its board are invited to respond. Substantive responses will be published or fairly summarized alongside this article.

Sources

Related investigations

Investigation · Litigation tactics

Drug Use, Threats, and Anonymous Emails: Who Are theothermarkh@proton.me and markh1980ny@gmail.com, and Why Do They Matter to SecurityScorecard & Yampolskiy's Defense?

Two unidentified email accounts. Allegations of antisemitic statements, threats, and drug use in federal litigation involving a longtime SecurityScorecard executive. And the same outside attorney raising questions about anonymous communications in another lawsuit. Is there a recurring litigation strategy, or something more troubling happening inside SecurityScorecard?

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