Bad Faith: Factor Offered a Code Review to Yampolskiy's Attorneys. It Was Never About IP. This Was About Bullying.
SecurityScorecard was offered multiple opportunities to resolve its concerns, including third-party forensic examination and access to Factor's application codebase. Why did a dispute that could have been investigated privately become a federal lawsuit and a public confrontation?
By Jason Thompson8 min readCommentary · Factor’s editorial position
01When the off-ramp was right in front of them
There is something fundamentally puzzling about the dispute between Factor Cybersecurity and SecurityScorecard. Factor is not a SecurityScorecard replacement. SecurityScorecard built its business around security ratings, external risk visibility and related third-party risk products. Factor is developing a supply-chain detection and response platform, designed to help organizations identify, investigate and respond to risks moving across interconnected suppliers. The companies work in adjacent corners of cybersecurity, but their products, operating models and approaches to the problem are materially different.
According to Thompson’s July 16, 2026 correspondence, Factor had taken no customers from SecurityScorecard and had not met SecurityScorecard in a single competitive sales opportunity. Those are Thompson’s representations, not independently verified market statistics. But they frame the question. If SecurityScorecard genuinely believed its intellectual property had been folded into Factor’s software, there was a straightforward way to find out.
Examine the evidence. Examine the machines. Examine the code.
Factor offered precisely that. Yet the dispute continued. The question is no longer simply whether SecurityScorecard had concerns about intellectual property. It is why repeated opportunities to investigate those concerns did not produce a resolution.
02July 16: bring in a third party
On July 14, 2026, SecurityScorecard’s general counsel sent Thompson a demand concerning company property, confidential information and the FACTOR name (Exhibit C). On July 16, Thompson answered Paul B. Keller of Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, who identified himself as representing SecurityScorecard. He offered a third-party examination of his computer, at SecurityScorecard’s expense:
“If you would like a third-party to review my machine, I am happy to allow it, provided you cover the expense.”
He also wrote: “We have full code provenance for our software.” These statements were not made after a lawsuit was filed. They were made in direct correspondence meant to address SecurityScorecard’s concerns. The offer did not prove that no improper information existed. It did establish Thompson’s willingness to submit to an examination on agreed conditions, which is what a party with something to hide usually avoids.
03July 20: examine Factor’s application codebase
Four days later Thompson went further. In a July 20 email to Keller, he agreed to the computer review, asked how it would work and how long it would take, and then offered something a company accused of copying code rarely volunteers: the code itself.
Evidence card · Email text, July 20, 2026
From
Jason Thompson, CEO, Factor
To
Paul B. Keller, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck (counsel for SecurityScorecard)
Subject
SecurityScorecard Company Property
Sent
July 20, 2026, 3:48 PM ET
“Regarding the computer review, that is fine as well. Just let me know how the computer review would proceed and what would be required of me and also how much time they would need. I am fully confident that we can resolve any concerns about company assets or information. I can extend this to Factor’s application code base as well or whatever is needed to bring about a resolution.”
Exact text as supplied by the site owner from his sent mail; highlighting added. The original message is not in the court record. Factor’s counsel later described this exchange in its August 10, 2026 letter to Keller (Exhibit D).
That is the most direct test available. A trade-secret or copying concern about software is ultimately a question about the software. Offering the codebase for review puts the disputed thing on the table. Declining to pursue that offer, while continuing to press the accusation in public and later in court, is difficult to square with a concern focused on intellectual property.
04July 21: a protocol, and separating the laptop from the code
Figure 1 · The off-ramps
1 · July 16, 2026
Offered third-party forensic review
“If you would like a third-party to review my machine, I am happy to allow it, provided you cover the expense.”
2 · July 20, 2026
Offered code review
“I can extend this to Factor’s application code base as well or whatever is needed to bring about a resolution.”
3 · July 21, 2026
Proposed a forensic protocol
A written agreement and review protocol to protect intellectual property and confidential information while allowing an examination.
4 · July 21, 2026
Proposed separating the laptop and the code
Return the SecurityScorecard laptop separately from any examination, with an independent review of Factor-owned materials.
5 · July 21, 2026 · Keller
Found “substantial common ground”
Keller wrote that there was “substantial common ground,” offered to revise the agreement and said SecurityScorecard’s retained firm, FTI Consulting, was ready to collect and image devices. FTI was not independent of SecurityScorecard.
Dates and quotations come from Thompson’s correspondence with Keller, supplied by the site owner. Keller’s July 21 reply is quoted from the same correspondence. Nothing in it shows Keller rejected the code review.
On July 21, Thompson sent a detailed proposed agreement and forensic-review protocol, intended to protect both sides’ intellectual property and confidential information while allowing an examination. The same day he proposed separating two issues that SecurityScorecard had bundled together: returning a SecurityScorecard laptop, and examining Factor’s code. The laptop could be handled on its own track; Factor-owned materials could be reviewed independently. Factor’s counsel later noted that SecurityScorecard first supplied the laptop’s serial number only in early August, a year after Thompson’s resignation, and asked for the device’s management logs (Exhibit D, p. 4).
05Keller’s response: FTI, and the independence question
Keller’s reply made clear that SecurityScorecard had retained FTI Consulting, so FTI could not accurately be described as independent of the party paying for its work. Factor’s August 10, 2026 letter to Keller confirms that a laptop Thompson provided went to FTI Consulting, records that SecurityScorecard acknowledged that computer was not its property, and demands its return and confirmation that FTI did not image it (Exhibit D, p. 4).
That matters. A review run by a firm hired and directed by one side is an investigation for that side. It is not the neutral, protocol-bound examination Thompson proposed. A party confident in its accusation has every reason to want an independent examiner, because an independent finding is far more useful in court and in the market. Factor, for its part, wanted safeguards for its intellectual property, confidential customer information and personal materials. Those positions needed to be reconciled. They were not inherently irreconcilable.
06A fair reading of the record: Keller did engage
07Why escalate a dispute that could be tested?
On this record, SecurityScorecard had an offer of a third-party review of Thompson’s machine, an offer to examine Factor’s application codebase, a proposed written protocol and a way to resolve the laptop separately. Its counsel saw common ground. Yet no agreed examination followed, and the dispute moved to cease-and-desist demands, public statements and, ultimately, federal litigation, which Factor brought after the company claimed rights to the FACTOR name and accused Factor of misappropriation (Complaint).
This is Factor’s position: the headline’s “bad faith” describes how SecurityScorecard as a company handled and escalated the dispute, not a finding by any court and not a claim that Keller refused the code review or acted in bad faith. In my view, when a company is offered the code it says was copied, its own lawyer sees common ground, and the matter still ends up in public confrontation and federal court, the fight was never really about intellectual property. It looks like pressure on a small startup, its founder, its advisors and its investors. SecurityScorecard is free to explain otherwise.
08What SecurityScorecard has not explained
With “substantial common ground” acknowledged on July 21, what obstacle kept the parties from an agreed examination?
Who decided not to pursue the offer to examine Factor’s application codebase, and why?
What, specifically, does it claim was taken, and where does it claim it appears in Factor’s software?
What did FTI Consulting do with the computer it received, and was it imaged?
Would SecurityScorecard have accepted a jointly selected or truly independent examiner?
If the concern was intellectual property, the code was offered. If the code was not the point, what was?
The FBI’s Boston Cyber Task Force interviewed multiple witnesses about Yampolskiy’s alleged access to Bitsight and requested evidence tracing Bitsight material into SecurityScorecard’s product.
A day after his firm sent preservation letters to a Factor executive and an advisor, Yampolskiy’s defense attorney Michael Yaeger demanded that the Chronicle come down. His email identified no factual error in the articles he attached.
On November 19, Carlton Fields attorney Michael D. Margulies emailed a Factor Cybersecurity executive and an advisor at their personal addresses. They were already represented by counsel.